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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ARTHUR ROY FRENCHIK,
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EXCHANGE,
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Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal by the Plaintiff from the
denial of benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act by the Industrial Commission of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
Defendants concur in the statement made in
the brief of the Plaintiff.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendants seek a decision of this Court
affirming the order of the Industrial Commission.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the hearing Plaintiff testified that about
10 o'clock on the morning of August 1, 1964, while
employed by I.M.L. Freight, Inc., he was in the
process of emptying a drain pan of oil when he felt
a sharp pain in his back. ( R. 35, 39) That the drain
sump was constructed so it protruded about eight
inches above the level of the floor. ( R. 35) ( R. 39)
The drain pan was about the lower third of an oil
drum which had been cut off. (R. 39) The pan filled
with oil weighed about 75 pounds. ( R. 16)
The Plaintiff reported to his foreman who sent
him to Dr. Frederick Hicken. ( R. 35, 36) On August
4th Dr. Hicken "X-rayed it, or had his radiologist
X-ray it." (R. 36) Dr. Hicken concluded from the
X-ray that no fracture had occurred. (R. 36) Dr.
Hicken determined at the time of the initial examination that the Plaintiff had sustained a strain.
(R. 1)

The Plaintiff did not see a doctor again until
May 20, 1966, some year and nine months after
August 1, 1964. (R. 41, 42) During the interim he
worked for the same employer, and he did about the
same kind of work that he had done prior to August
1, 1964. (R. 47-48)
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Plaintiff saw Dr. Gentile, a chiropractor, on
May 20, 1966 (R. 49), and Dr. Bardole, another
chiropractor, in July 1966. (R. 50) Plaintiff also
went to the Veterans Hospital about February 27,
1967 (R. 73), where X-rays were taken, the report
being "no evidence of fracture injury or unusual
soft tissue." ( R. 74) The examining physician wrote
in the hospital record (R. 77) at the bottom of the
page: "I don't think this boy is markedly incapacitated and should be able to go back to work." On
November 10, 1966, Plaintiff returned to the office
of Drs. Hicken and McAllister. Dr. McAllister saw
the Plaintiff and sent the Plaintiff to Dr. Q. B. Coray
for new X-rays. Dr. McAllister examined the X-rays,
including the old X-ray, and said "they looked okay."
(R. 51) At that time the Plaintiff asked permission to see an orthopedist and Dr. Hicken advised
that he could do so. ( R. 52) Thereafter the Plaintiff
went to see Dr. Neal C. Capel. Dr. Capel hospitalized
the Plaintiff at the Cottonwood Hospital on March
27, 1967. (R. 57) The Plaintiff testified that he has
not undergone surgery. (R. 57) He further testified
that Dr. Capel told him that "my fracture was
healed" so the Plaintiff decided not to go back to
Dr. Capel. (R. 58) After leaving Dr. Capel, the
Plaintiff has just rested. (R. 60)
Plaintiff went to Dr. Wayne M. Hebertson, a
neurologist, on November 29, 1966, who did not find
any significant abnormalities. (R. 70)
Liability was denied, and an application for
hearing was filed.
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After the hearing before the Industrial Commission held April 27, 1967, the Commission appointed a special medical panel consisting of Dr.
Boyd G. Holbrook, Chairman, Dr. Wayne Hebertson,
and Dr. Robert Mohr. (R. 65) On July 21, 1967,
Plaintiff wrote the Commission stating that he was
not pleased with the appointment of the panel, and
that he refused to see Dr. Mohr, a psychiatrist, for
a fractured back. (R. 67) Dr. Thomas D. Noonan
was appointed to replace Dr. Hebertsen on the
panel. ( R. 68)
Drs. Holbrook and Noonan met with the Plaintiff on December 5, 1967, examined him, and reviewed
the records and X-rays. ( R. 86) The report of the
medical panel was received by the Industrial Commission on January 2, 1968. ( R. 86)
The panel found:
( 1) This applicant may have sustained a
strain of his spine 8-1-64.
(2) This panel is unable to relate his
present difficulty or his lost time from work
to this strain of the spine that presumably
healed prior to this examination.
( 3) There is no significant pre-existing
condition. The ring apophysis of Ll is felt to
be insignificant. ( R. 92)
Objections to the report were filed by the Plaintiff ( R. 94-95) , following which the Commission
held a further hearing (R. 100-122) at which Dr.
Holbrook, the panel chairman, testified confirming
by his testimony the findings of the medical panel.
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The Medical Panel found no evidence of fracture.
( R. 11 7) The Industrial Commission thereafter reviewed the file and the testimony and issued its order
denying the Plaintiff's claim. (R. 127)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE BASED UPON
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND SHOULD NOT
BE OVERRULED.
The Plaintiff saw Dr. Hicken on August 1 and
4, 1964, after which he did not see a doctor again
until May 20, 1966 (R. 41), some year and a half
after the accident happened. He did not leave work
until February 27, 1967. (R. 16) He left work on
his own, not on doctor's orders. (R. 55) In the meantime while working he had been doing essentially
the same kind of work that he had done prior to
the time that he was injured. (R. 48)

Q. Okay. But in general you have been
doing about the same kind of work for the last,
since August 1st.
A. Well, you might call it generally the
same kind of work.
Q. In detail, it might vary from day to
day?
A. Yes.
After leaving work Plaintiff saw a chiropractor, Dr. Gentile, on May 20, 1966. (R. 83) On Febru-
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ary 27, 1967, Plaintiff entered the Veterans Hospital where the radiographic report was "There is no
evidence of fracture injury or unusual soft tissue,"
( R. 74) The examining doctor also wrote, "I don't
think this boy is markedly incapacitated, and he
should be able to go back to work." ( R. 77)
The Plaintiff cancelled his appointment at the
Veterans Hospital. ( R. 73)
On November 10, 1966, he returned to Dr. Hicken's office where he saw Dr. McAllister (R. 50)
who looked at the old X-ray and said they looked
okay. ( R. 51)
The Plaintiff requested permission from Dr.
Hicken to see an orthopedist so he reported to Dr.
Neal Capel who admitted him to the Cottonwood
Hospital on March 27, 1967 (R. 54), where he remained for three days. ( R. 55) A myelogram was
performed in the hospital but the Plaintiff has not
undergone surgery. (R. 55-57) Dr. Capel's letter
addressed to the Industrial Commission dated December 23, 1966, contains the following:
In view of the negative findings on X-ray
he was released for further continuance of
conservative care at home.
FINAL DIAGNOSIS: More in the direction of a ankylosing spondylitis which is too
early to diagnose fully on X-ray. For further
observation. (R. 13)
Dr. R. H. Keller, Radiologist, reported, "No
evidence of a herniated disc is noted." (R 14, 18)
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The Plaintiff was not satisfied with Dr. Capel
so from the time that he left the hospital he has not
been back to Dr. Capel or under medical care. The
Plaintiff testified as follows:
Q. Now, has Dr. Capel - is he giving
you some treatment now?
A No.
Q. Or doing something for you now?
A. No. I decided not to return to him.
Q. You've what?
A. Decided not to go back to him.
Q. Why is that?
A. Well, because he told me that my fracture was healed, and I - I have reason to
believe it isn't healed. I have an X-ray on
me right now taken two days ago. If you want
to look at it up to the window, you can clearly
see it, and clearly see it isn't healed.
Q. In other words, what you are saying
is that you do not believe what your doctor's
told you; is that it?
A. Yes. (R. 57-58)
The medical panel had the advantage of the
findings of Dr. Capel and of Dr. Keller, which are
part of the record. ( R. 6-15, and 18, 19)
The Plaintiff also saw Dr. Wayne M. Hebertson, a neurologist, who in his letter of August 2,
1967 (R. 70), addressed to Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook
advised that he had examined Mr. Frenchik on
November 29, 1966. He wrote:
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I did not find any significant abnormalities on the patient's general examination. Examinatio!l of the patient's back and neurological funct10ns was normal except for some pain
in the lower back in association with extention.
(R. 70)
The record is clear that although the Plaintiff
went to several qualified and respected doctors, they
on final diagnosis did not find anything seriously
wrong with the Plaintiff. In due course a hearing was
held following which pursuant to the provisions of
Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., 1953, the medical aspects of
this claim were assigned to a medical panel consisting of Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, Chairman, Dr. Robert
Mohr, Psychiatrist, and Dr. Wayne Hebertson,
Neurologist; later as Dr. Hebertson had examined
the Plaintiff, Dr. Thomas Noonan was appointed
in his place.
The above mentioned section of our code provides in part as follows :
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident or for death, arising out of or in the course of employment, and
where the employer or insurance carrier
denied liability, the commission shall refer
the medical aspects of the case to a medical
panel appointed by the Commission ... T~e
medical panel shall make such study ... as it
may determine and the~e~fter make 3: report
in writing to the Commiss10n ... If obJections
to such report are filed it shall be the .duty of
the Commission to set the case for hearing, and
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at such hearing any party so desiring may
request the Commission to have the medical
panel or any of its members present at the
hearing for examination and cross-examination. Upon such hearing the written report of
the panel may be considered as an exhibit but
shall not be considered as evidence in the case
except insofar as it is sustained by the testimony admitted.
The medical panel report was made by the acting panel members after a complete examination of
the file of the Industrial Commission, including the
testimony of the applicant and a physical examination of him by panel members.
Counsel for the Plaintiff, in his brief (P.B. 7)
refers to the letter of the Industrial Commission
appointing the special panel ( R. 65) which is in
part as follows:
The hearing examiner specifically interested in the fallowing:
1. The results of a complete examination of Dr. Mohr, in his specialty, and what
bearing or effect, if any, in terms of medic~!
probability, his findings have upon the Apphcant's present condition.
It is contended by the Attorney for the Plaintiff that because Dr. Holbrook testified that he did
not consult with Dr. Mohr that there was not a
complete examination in accordance with the direction of the Industrial Commission. (P.B. 7)
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Attention of the Court is called to the letter of
Mr. Frenchik, addressed to the Industrial Commission, in which Mr. Frenchik wrote:
I am not at all pleased with the appointed
medical panel to investigate my case. ( 3) Dr.
Robert Mohr i,s a psychiatmt and I am certainly not going to see a psychiatrist for a
fractured back. (R. 67) (emphasis ours)
Under the circumstances the panel could not
have had Dr. Mohr join in the report as the Plaintiff
had refused to see him. It is difficult to see how
the Plaintiff can now object to the absence of Dr.
Mohr on the panel, or for the failure of Dr. Mohr to
make an examination of the Plaintiff when the
Plaintiff objected to the inclusion of the doctor on
the panel and stated emphatically that he was "not
going to see a psychiatrist for a fractured back."
There is no evidence in the record that the Plaintiff
ever saw Dr. Mohr.
Plaintiff in his brief ( P. B. 8) complains that
the panel did not examine the X-rays alleged to have
been taken by Dr. Hicken on August 1, 1964. In respect to this point Dr. Holbrook testified that as far
as he knew no X-rays were taken at that time. (P. B.
8) In response to questions by Plaintiff (R. 114-115)
Dr. Holbrook said:
A. I don't believe that Dr. Hicken took
any X-rays. Because Dr. Hicken doesn't have
an X-ray machine, as far as I know.
Q. Have you ever been in his office?
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A. Yes.

Q. And you never seen the X-rays?
A. No.
The medical panel pursuant to the direction of
the Commission examined the entire record of the
Commission and the medical reports contained therein. (R. 104) Dr. Hicken's report is part of the record.
(R. 1) Dr. Holbrook testified that Dr. Hicken's report was examined. (R. 108) It makes no mention
of X-rays having been taken at that time.
This Court has said that it considered the medical panel a useful means to resolve complex medical
questions. In Jensen vs. United States Fuel Company, 18 U 2d 414, 424 P 2d 440, this Court said:
We recognize the value and usefulness of
an impartial medical panel to make an independent examination and diagnosis in such
cases. We are also in accord with the position
of the Plaintiff that it is not the panel's prerogative to encroach upon the authority vested
in the Commission to make the findings of
fact and render the decision upon the application. Its proper purpose is limited to medical
examination and diagnosis, the evidence of
which is to be considered by the Commission
in arriving at its decision. There is no indication here that this limitation was transgressed.
In referring the case to the medical panel, t~e
Commission stated that they should make their
report upon the assumption that an accident
had taken place and determine what part, if
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any, it had played in causing the Plaintiff's
condition.
One other Utah case in which the medical panel
is mentioned is that of Oscar Hackford, Plaintiff, vs.
the Industrial Commission of Utah, 14 U 2d 184,
380 P 2d 927. In that case objection was made to the
panel report. At the hearing the panel chairman testified on behalf of the panel. The decision of the Industrial Commission was affirmed. The findings
of the Industrial Commission were apparently based
upon the report of the medical panel and the testimony of the chairman of the panel which the Court
felt was substantial enough evidence to permit it
to sustain and affirm the decision of the Commission.
In the case before the Court the Industrial Commission properly instructed the medical panel as to
its function and further advised the panel that it
should make its report upon the assumption that an
accident had taken place and determine what part
the accident played in causing the Plaintiff's condi'tion. ( R. 65) This the panel proceeded to do and
made a finding adverse to the Plaintiff only after it
had the opportunity to examine the record, the medical reports and the Plaintiff.
Mr. Frenchik may have strained his back on
August 1, 1964; however the numerous medical examinations which he has undergone have failed to
result in any findings that his troubles stem from
the August 1, 1964, incident. Furthermore, the
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Plaintiff continued working for 18 months after
August 1, 1964, during which time he did not seek
medical attention. The Industrial Commission was
not arbitrary or capricious in considering the evid.ence and lack of evidence in reaching its conclus10n.
In connection with the claim that the opinion
of the Medical Panel might have been different had
X-rays claimed to have been taken by Dr. Hicken,
the referee at the second hearing inquired of Dr.
Holbrook as follows: ( R. 118)

Q. Doctor, in light of the appplicant's
medical history, which the panel considered,
do you feel that there would in all probability, be anything in the X-rays of August 4,
'64, taken by Dr. Hicken, that would not have
appeared subsequently, or which would have
changed?
A. I would think that it is unlikely that
there would be.
In Jensen vs. United States Fuel, supra, the
Plaintiff, as has the Plaintiff in the case before the
Court, presented evidence to show that he had a bad
back which was painful and distressed him; that he
had suffered a back injury while employed. However,
the Court in the Jens en case said at U. 417:
We see no reason to disagree with Plaintiff's contention that his evidence shows without dispute that he had a bad back which w~s
painful and distressing to him,. In fact t~1s
seems to have been so for some time even pr10r
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to the accident. Furthermore, there is substantial, competent and believable evidence that he
suffered a bruise to his back by bumping it on
the bolting machine in Defendant's mine in
July, 1964. However, this is not true of the
critical issue in this case: whether that incident had any causal relationship to the condition of the intervertebral disc and bony structure of his back which required the operations.
While both parties argue that the evidence on
this disputed issue is conclusive in their favor,
there is a basis in the evidence from which the
Commission could reasonably refuse to find
that the accident was what caused Plaintiff's
d'isability. Therefore we cannot conclude that
the denial of an award was capricious or arbitrary. (emphasis ours)
POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CONCLUSIVE UNLESS
ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS.
It has been said by the Supreme Court in numerous decisions that pursuant to Section 35-1-84,
U.C.A., 1953, that only if the Industrial Commission
arbitrarily disregards competent, uncontradicted
evidence will the decision of the Commission be reversed. Further that the Commission's order should
be affirmed unless the Court finds that the Commission acted capriciously, arbitrarily or unreasonably in the denial of compensation.
In Kent vs. Industrial Commission, 89 U 381, 57
P 2d 724 at 385 U. the Court said:

15
In the case of denial of compensation,
the record must disclose that there is material
substantial, competent, uncontradicted evi~
dence sufficient to make a disregard of it justify the conclusion as a matter of law, that the
I~dustria} Commission arbitrarily and capric10usly disregarded the evidence or unreasonably refused to believe such evidence.
In Burton vs. Industrial Commission, 13 U 2d
353, 37 4 P 2d 439, this Court said at 354 U:
In order to reverse the finding and order
made, the Plaintiff must show that there is
such creditable, uncontradicted evidence in her
favor that the Commission's refusal to so find
was capricious and arbitrary.
See also the recent case of Vause vs. Industrial
Commission of Utah and the State Insurance Fund,
17 U 2d 217, 407 P 2d 1006. This was a proceeding to
review the decision of the Industrial Commission
denying compensation for disability alleged to have
been the result of an occupational disease arising
from exposure to dust and fumes. 'The Order of
Denial was affirmed, and this Court said at page
220 Utah:
It is thus apparent that there is ample
basis in the evidence upon which the Commission could reasonably refuse to believe that the
Plaintiff contracted an occupational disease
arising out of his employment. This Court cannot properly reverse the Commission and compel an award unless there is creditable evi-
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dence without substantial contradiction which
points so clearly and persuasively in Plaintiff's favor that failure to so find would justify the conclusion that the Commission acted
capriciously, arbitrarily, or unreasonably in
disregarding or refusing to believe the evidence. No such situation is shown to exist here.
(emphasis ours)
This question has been ruled upon many times
by this Court. In the case of Norris vs. Industrial
Commission, 90 U 256, 61 P 2d 413, this Court restated the well-supported rule that it is for the Commission to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to
be the final arbitrator of the facts.
This Court took the same position in Baker vs.
Industrial Commission, 17 U 2d 141, 405 P 2d 613.
CONCLUSION
We submit that the Industrial Commission's
Order is founded upon substantial evidence, that it
did not act in a capricious or arbitrary manner, and
that its Order should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CHARLES WELCH, JR.
922 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for
Defendants
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General

